To assess the role that consumers can play in encouraging environmental compliance, we examine the U.S. hazardous waste management industry to determine (1) whether environmental performance affects consumer demand and (2) whether markets affect compliance behavior. We find that noncompliance does decrease demand, at least in the short-term. While we do not find any evidence that market size affects compliance, local competition does appear to increase compliance. However, as competition becomes less localized, it has a smaller, if any, effect. Finally, regardless of the pressures exerted by consumers to comply, commercial managers are more likely to violate than on-site managers.
Introduction
As resources available for traditional, monitoring-based enforcement of environmental regulations decrease at both the state and federal level, regulators must look to other methods to encourage compliance.
1 One alternative source of enforcement pressure is the market. As many authors have recognized, both consumers and investors have the potential to exert significant influence on environmental performance. 2 In theory, consumers that care about the environment should favor products and manufacturers that are environmentally protective. Similarly, investors
should demand higher levels of environmental performance both to gain competitive advantage in the market and to limit future liability. However, for consumers and investors to be effective at changing environmental behavior, they must have information on a firm's environmental performance. Over the past decade, EPA has worked to increase access to such information through programs like the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) and the Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) database. A number of studies have shown that such information does appear to influence investor behavior and, in turn, firm environmental performance. 3 However, to our knowledge there is no evidence as to whether consumers also use such information to act as informal regulators. 4 The purpose of this paper is to determine whether consumers can act as a complement to traditional enforcement efforts by examining compliance in the hazardous waste management industry. The hazardous waste management industry provides a good test of this hypothesis for two reasons: (1) the consumers in this market -hazardous waste generatorshave a vested interest in the environmental performance of hazardous waste managers and (2) the information necessary to distinguish between competitors should be readily available.
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), generators of hazardous waste are responsible for their waste from "cradle to grave" and are liable for any environmental damages that result from their waste. Generators may choose to manage their own waste or pay a licensed hazardous waste management facility to take the waste. However, a generator continues to be liable for any damages that result from mismanagement of its waste regardless of who 3 See, for example Konar and Cohen (1997) and Foulon, Lanoie, and Laplante (2002) . 4 There are a number of empirical papers that focus on eco-labeling or green products (see, for example, Bjorner, Hansen and Russell (2004) and Teisl, Roe, and Hicks (2002) ). The majority of these papers seek to determine the factors that influence consumer preferences and their willingness to pay for green products rather than on the extent to which consumers can influence environmental compliance.
treats and disposes of the waste. Thus generators who choose to send waste to commercial waste management facilities have an incentive to ensure that those facilities are complying with hazardous waste regulations and managing waste in an environmentally safe manner. For example, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency recommends that generators visit prospective hazardous waste management facilities and investigate each facility's compliance record prior to contracting with them for management services. 5 Moreover, Alberini and Bartholomew (1999) show that consumers of hazardous waste management services do appear to consider the compliance history of facilities in choosing where to send waste.
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The paper examines the effect of hazardous waste management facilities' environmental performance on consumers' demand for their services and, in turn, whether markets can affect the compliance behavior of hazardous waste managers. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature on environmental compliance and the role of consumers and markets in affecting environmental performance. Section 3 provides a brief background on hazardous waste management and enforcement in the US. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes. 6 However, their results are mixed. Using data on the disposal choice of California halogenated solvent waste generators, the authors found that generators were less likely to ship to publicly traded firms with a past record of violations, although they were more likely to ship to privately held firms with violations.
Related Literature
The studies most closely related to this analysis are those that examine the effect of environmental information disclosure on investors and/or the performance of regulated entities.
A number of papers have shown that stock market prices respond to negative environmental information such as environmental enforcement actions (e.g., Badrinath and Bolster, (1996) ), TRI emission levels (e.g., Hamilton (1995) ), and general noncompliance or poor environmental performance (e.g. Lanoie, Laplante, and Roy (1998) ). 7 A study by Konar and Cohen (1997) goes a step further to examine not only the effect of public disclosure on investor behavior, but also the effect of investor behavior on the environmental performance of regulated entities. The authors analyze the effect of TRI disclosures on the stock prices of U.S. firms as well as the effect of stock price declines on subsequent pollution levels. They find that firms with the largest negative stock price reactions to the release of environmental information responded with the largest decreases in future pollution. Thus not only do investors respond to poor environmental performance, firms change environmental performance in response to investor actions.
A few studies have focused on the effect of information disclosure on firm environmental behavior without explicitly modeling the response of consumers or investors. For example, Afsah, Laplante, and Wheeler (1997) find that creation of a public disclosure program in Indonesia resulted in significant improvements in environmental performance of the firms involved in the program. While the firms may have been concerned about both investor and consumer responses to negative environmental reports, the finding that multinational and 7 Cohen (1999) provides a more detailed overview of this literature.
domestic private firms were more responsive to the information disclosure than publicly held firms suggests that investors were the more influential market channel in that case. Foulon, Lanoie, and Laplante (2002) consider the effect of information disclosure along with traditional enforcement methods (inspections and fines) on firms in the Canadian pulp and paper industry.
They find that being placed on a list of noncompliant firms led firms to improve their environmental performance beyond what would have been expected from the traditional enforcement methods. In this case, the information disclosure could result in pressure from markets (investors and consumers) as well as from the community at large, both of which ultimately influence firm behavior.
Although to our knowledge no papers have directly estimated the role that consumers play in affecting environmental compliance, several have considered the impact of consumers on environmental performance more generally. For example, Arora and Cason (1996) examine participation in EPA's voluntary pollution reduction program known as 33/50 and find that participation rates in the program are greater in industries with greater consumer contact.
Similarly, Anton, Deltas and Khanna (2004) find that firms in closer contacts with consumers are more likely to be more environmentally proactive and adopt environmental management systems. We hope to add to the empirical literature on the ability of markets to increase environmental performance by focusing more directly on the role that consumers play in improving environmental compliance.
Background on Hazardous Waste Management
Hazardous waste is any discarded material that exhibits a hazardous characteristic (that is, is ignitable, corrosive, reactive, or toxic) or is specifically listed by the EPA as hazardous waste. Once hazardous waste is generated it must be managed in accordance with federal regulations. Under these regulations, waste can be stored only in approved tanks, containers, or buildings and cannot be stored indefinitely. Ultimately, the waste must be treated either to remove the constituents which render it hazardous or to immobilize the hazardous constituents so that they will not be released to the environment. After treatment the waste either must be disposed in approved units such as landfills or injection wells or it may no longer be subject to regulation, depending on the type of waste. Generators can choose to treat and dispose their waste themselves or they can send their waste off site for management. To comply with EPA's hazardous waste regulations facilities must build, operate and maintain management systems in accordance with requirements; obtain the necessary permits for such systems; institute good housekeeping practices; keep records and file reports on waste management activities; and train personnel both in day-to-day operations and for emergencies.
EPA enforces the regulations primarily through facility inspections, although violations which result in damage to human health or the environment are sometimes self-reported or reported by third parties. Once a violation is discovered, the appropriate enforcement agency can initiate administrative, civil, or criminal actions, all of which can include penalty provisions.
Empirical Analysis
The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether consumers of hazardous waste management services are affected by managers' environmental performance -specifically their compliance with hazardous waste regulations -and in turn whether this affects the compliance behavior of hazardous waste managers. To answer the first question, we look at changes in the quantity of waste received by commercial hazardous waste managers to determine whether 10 Specifications will vary across treatment technologies and depend on both the technical and regulatory parameters under which the system can operate.
noncompliance results in a decrease in the quantity of waste managed. 11 To answer the second question we look at managers' compliance behavior to determine whether market size and competition affect the compliance of commercial firms. In particular, market competition should serve as a good proxy for the ability of consumers to exert pressure on managers because the more competitive a market, the more choices available to consumers and the stronger the ability of consumers to influence firm behavior. Additionally, we believe that using both market size and competition will focus on consumers as the source of pressure rather than investors, as one of the primary concerns of investors -future liability -is not affected by the level of market competition. 
Effect of Compliance on Consumer Demand
If consumers care about compliance, then a poor compliance history should decrease the quantity of waste sent to a hazardous waste management facility, ceteris paribus. To test this assumption, we look at changes in the quantity of waste received by commercial hazardous 11 Alternatively, we could have examined the location choice of hazardous waste generators to determine whether compliance history affects the generator's choice. However, there are over 600,000 hazardous waste generators so we chose to focus on the supply side rather than the demand side to reduce the data requirements of the analysis.
12 Of course, if investors also care about environmental performance as a way to increase sales to green consumers, market competition could affect investor pressure. This magnifies the role that consumers play in affecting firm environmental performance because they can exert pressure directly as well as indirectly through investors.
waste managers to determine whether noncompliance results in a decrease in the quantity of waste managed. Ideally we would also control for all the other attributes of hazardous waste management that a facility offers. Unfortunately, one of the primary attributes -the price of waste management services -is not available. Additionally, even if it were available, there is no one measure of price at a hazardous waste management facility as the price of services would depend on the hazardous characteristics of the waste managed. Thus to the extent that facilities may decrease price to offset a poor compliance record, the results of this analysis will be biased downward.
Data on the quantity of waste received at management facilities is collected by EPA every odd year through the Biennial Reporting Survey (BRS). For this analysis we examine the change in the quantity of waste managed at commercial facilities for two time periods, between 1997 and 1999 and between 1993 and 1999. In 1999, there were 420 commercial hazardous waste management facilities that accepted waste from offsite generators. 13 Of those, 336 were operating in 1997 and 289 were operating in 1993. For each set of facilities we calculated the percent change in the quantity of waste managed between the beginning and end of the relevant time period. 14 We then ran series of simple linear regressions of the percent change as a function of facility and market characteristics, as well as a number of variables designed to capture the 13 This figure does not include 25 federal facilities that accepted waste from other federal hazardous waste generators because federal facilities should not be subject to consumer or market pressure.
14 We also examined the absolute change in the quantity of waste managed (measured in tons) but found that the percent change performed better in our regressions.
type of information that consumers could obtain about a facility's compliance history. Table 1 presents a summary of the data used in these regressions. As shown, a number of facilities significantly increased the quantity of waste managed in percentage terms, and a number of facilities decreased to almost nothing. The largest absolute increase in quantity during either period was approximately 800,000 tons and the largest absolute decrease was over 1 million tons.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 2 . We included a number of facility characteristics as controls in the regression. The first is the dummy variable Captive which is equal to one if the facility only takes waste from other facilities owned by the same parent company. The second is the variable Permitted which indicates whether the facility operates a waste management system that must be permitted by EPA prior to operation. Note that the coefficients on these two variables are not significant in any of the regressions. Next we included
Total Waste Managed which measures the log of the total quantity (in tons) of waste managed (both waste received from off-site and waste generated on-site) at the facility in 1999. 15 The coefficient on this variable is positive in all of the regressions, although it is only significant for the 1997 to 1999 period. This suggests that there are economies of scale in waste management, as demand appears to be concentrating at larger facilities. The next three variables measure the complexity and type of waste management services offered at the facility: Number of Waste Management Systems measures the number of different types of waste management offered by the facility and Combustion and Land Disposal are dummy variables indicating whether the 15 Because the size of the commercial facilities varies between 1 and 300 million tons, the log of tons managed performs significantly better than tons.
facility operates combustion or land disposal facilities, respectively. None of the coefficients on these variables are significant in any of the regressions.
The next set of variables capture differences in the markets in which the facilities are located. Because hazardous waste transport is relatively expensive, markets for waste management are regional, and market size and competition vary significantly across facilities.
16
Because there is no obvious market definition for hazardous waste facilities, we defined a facility's market to be a circle with a radius of 100 miles centered on the facility in question.
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The first market variable is Market Size which is the log of the tons of hazardous waste being sent off-site by large quantity generators located in the market. 18 We also included As discussed at the beginning of this section, we cannot obtain data on the price of waste management services at these facilities. If facilities decrease price to offset a poor compliance record, then our results will be biased downward. Given that we do find some evidence that hazardous waste generators respond to negative compliance information, it does appear that consumers may be able to exert pressure on waste management facilities to increase environmental compliance. Therefore the next step is to examine facilities' compliance behavior to see whether we can find evidence that consumers can serve as an informal enforcement mechanism.
Effect of Markets on Compliance
As discussed in Section 4.1, hazardous waste regulations are quite complex and there is no one obvious way to measure of compliance. For the purposes of this analysis, we consider a facility to be out of compliance if one or more violation of hazardous waste regulations is detected at the facility. Specifically, the dependent variable in this analysis is a binary variable equal to 1 if there is any detected hazardous waste violation at the waste management facility during 1999. Because violations are only detected during the course of a facility inspection, if a facility is not inspected there is no data on whether the facility is in compliance. Thus our analysis must control for this censoring of data by using data on whether or not a facility has been inspected. In addition, compliance and inspections are jointly determined. That is, a regulator's decision to inspect a particular facility depends in part on the likelihood that the facility will be noncompliant and the facility's decision to comply depends in part on the likelihood of inspection. The censored bivariate probit model developed by Greene (1992) accounts for both of these factors. The censored bivariate probit uses maximum likelihood to estimate a probit model with sample selection where the selection equation and the underlying equation of interest may have correlated errors.
More specifically, both the probability of a violation and the probability of an inspection are modeled as latent variables, 
As discussed in Poirier (1980) the bivariate probit model is identified if there is at least one variable that affects whether the facility will be inspected but does not affect whether the facility violates the regulations, as well as at least one variable that affects whether the facility violates the regulations but does not affect whether the facility will be inspected.
The results of the censored bivariate probit are reported in Table 3 . Following other empirical analyses of compliance (see, for example Helland (1998) , Foulon, Lanoie, and Laplante (2002) , and Stafford (2002)) we included a number of facility characteristics (e.g., the quantity of waste managed at the facility, the number and types of technologies at each facility, past compliance history) and state characteristics (e.g., liability regimes, total enforcement effort) as explanatory variables. 21 The first five facility variables are identical to the variables used in the analysis described in Section 4. Finally, we include two variables to measure market competition, Market Size (measured as the log of tons of waste generated within 100 miles of the facility) and Number of Competitors (normalized by the total size in the market in thousands of tons). Since a facility's market is defined for the purposes of this analysis as a circle with a radius of 100 miles centered on the facility, neither of these variables should affect the probability of inspection, and neither of the To get a better sense of the effect of these explanatory variables on the probability of inspections and compliance, Table 4 reports the change in the probability (in percentage points) of a representative facility being inpected or violating the regulations that would result from various changes in the explanatory variables. Table 4 Now consider the competition variables. Note that market size does not have a significant effect on the probability of violation, regardless of market definition. However, the coefficients on size are generally positive, as we expected. Additionally, size does have a significant and negative effect on inspection probability for markets of 500 miles, and the sign of the coefficient on size in consistently negative in the Inspection equation. If large markets increase regulators' workloads, market size might decrease inspection probability. The number of competitors in the market does significantly decrease the probability of violation when markets are defined as 100 miles, and the effect is quantitatively quite large. An increase in the number of competitors by one standard deviation, that is increasing the number of competitors per 10,000 tons of waste from 1.03 to 5.04, decreases the probability of violation from 41% to 7%. While the coefficients on number of competitors are not significant for markets of 250 and 1000 miles, these coefficients are also negative, although the quantitative effect is also much smaller. Thus it appears that local competition can have a significant positive impact on compliance, but the impact decreases as the geographic scope of the market grows. In terms of the effect of competition on inspections, it does appear that in more competitive markets, the probability of inspection may be lower (although the effect is statistically significant only for a 500 mile market radius). This could be due to the fact that regulators recognize, to some extent, the positive effect that competition can have on compliance incentives. Finally, note that the correlation coefficient for the two equations, ρ, is positive as expected and statistically significant.
As a final step in the analysis, we compare the compliance behavior of commercial waste management facilities to that of on-site waste management facilities. The universe for this final analysis includes all non-federal hazardous waste management facilities in the continental U.S.
in 1999. 23 As in the commercial facility analysis, we conduct a censored bivariate probit 23 Federal facilities are excluded because the impact of penalties on federal facilities is not the same as the impact on for-profit companies, and thus compliance behavior will be different.
Additionally there are no federal commercial facilities.
analysis. However, since market characteristics should not affect on-site facilities, we exclude those variables from the regression. We also add a dummy variable Commercial that indicates whether the facility is commercial. Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. Note that commercial facilities are both more likely to be inspected and more likely to violate the regulations than on-site facilities. While this may be contrary to initial expectations given the fact that commercial facilities are subject to external pressure from consumers and on-site facilities are not, there are two possible explanations for this result. First, because on-site managers are solely responsible for any environmental damages resulting from the mismanagement of hazardous waste, they may be more compliant with hazardous waste regulations. Second, a reputation for environmental compliance may also be important to on-site generators whose investors or customers would be leery of a company with a poor environmental record. This second explanation is consistent with the finding that captive facilities are significantly less likely to violate regulations. Like on-site managers, owners of captive facilities are also unable to spread liability to third parties. In addition, only large firms are likely to find it profitable to operate captive facilities, and firms with "deep-pockets" may have higher incentives to avoid environmental liability.
We also included one additional variable, State Management Facilities, which measures the total number of management facilities in the state. One might expect that being in a state with a large hazardous waste management sector would increase the workload on regulators and thus decrease the probability of inspection at any one facility, which is consistent with the negative and significant coefficient in the Inspection equation. However, the negative coefficient in the Violation equation appears inconsistent with this lower probability of inspection. It could be the case that states with a larger number of management facilities provide more outreach to facilities, thus decreasing violations.
Finally, to get a better sense of the size of the effect the explanatory variables have on both inspections and violations, Table 6 reports the change in the probability (in percentage points) of a representative facility being inpected or violating the regulations that would result from various changes in the explanatory variables. This representative facility has the mean values for continuous explanatory variables and the median values for discrete explanatory variables. The probability of an inspection at this facility is 29 percent and the probability of a violation is 19 percent. If the facility were commercial, the probability of inspection would increase to 41 percent and the probability of violation to 30 percent. However, if the facility were captive, the probability of violation would decrease to 16 percent. 
Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines the role that consumers can play in encouraging environmental compliance by analyzing whether the demand for hazardous waste management services depends on a facility's compliance record and in turn, whether this affects compliance at hazardous waste management facilities. The hazardous waste management industry provides a unique opportunity to study this issue because hazardous waste generators -the consumers in this market -are liable for any damages the result from mismanagement of their waste and thus have a vested interest in the environmental performance of hazardous waste management facilities.
To assess the effect of past compliance on consumer behavior, we look at changes in the quantity 24 Since all captive facilities are also commercial, the probability is 19% + 11% -14% = 16%.
of waste managed by commercial hazardous waste management facilities over two time periods, 1997 periods, to 1999 periods, and 1993 periods, to 1999 periods, . For the 1997 periods, -1999 period, we find that past noncompliance does decrease the quantity of waste sent to a facility. However, for the 1993 to 1999 period, we do not find any significant decrease associated with poor compliance history. If facilities decrease the price of their services to offset a poor compliance record, our results would be biased downward. Alternatively, it may be that over a long time period, changes in regulatory requirements and economic conditions outweigh the effects of poor compliance.
Given that we do find some evidence that hazardous waste generators respond to negative compliance information, we examine the extent to which facilities' compliance behavior is influenced by market size and market competition. Market competition in particular should serve as a good proxy for the ability of consumers to exert pressure on managers because the more competitive a market, the more choices available to consumers and the stronger the ability of consumers to influence firm behavior. Although we do not find any evidence that market size affects compliance behavior, we do find that local competition serves to increase hazardous waste compliance. However, as competition becomes less localized, it has a smaller, if any, effect on compliance. While regulators may be changing inspection targeting somewhat in response to local competition, it appears that there is more room to use local competition as an effective substitute for enforcement resources.
Finally, regardless of the pressures exerted by consumers to comply, commercial hazardous waste managers are more likely to violate hazardous waste regulations than on-site managers. This can be explained in part by the fact that on-site managers are solely responsible for any environmental damages that results from mismanagement while commercial facilities may be able to share liability with the original generators of the waste that they manage. In addition, since hazardous waste management is not the primary business for on-site managers, a poor environmental record may be more detrimental to on-site managers than commercial managers. Captive hazardous waste managers, that is firms that manage hazardous waste for other facilities owned by the same company, are even less likely to violate than on-site managers. 
